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Abstract: Since the mid-1990s Brazil has become one of the main recipients of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the automobile sector. As already happened in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, world car manufacturers are investing heavily in the building of new car
plants. The reasons behind the renewed interest of car companies in Brazil have been the
huge and expanding internal market and the relatively stable macroeconomic panorama
of the mid-1990s. However, and in contrast to what happened in the 1950s and 1960s,
most new car plants are being located outside the São Paulo metropolitan area, the
traditional hub of the Brazilian motor industry. Although some argue that, among other
reasons, this is the result of lower labour costs elsewhere in Brazil and of improved
infrastructure in the country, this article tries to demonstrate that the recent
decentralization of the Brazilian motor industry is basically linked to perverse territorial
competition among Brazilian states. This sort of territorial competition –known in Brazil
as the ‘fiscal’ wars- represents a pure waste of resources, both for the states engaged in
them, as well as for Brazil as a whole.
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Introduction
The process of economic stabilization undertaken by Brazil since the arrival of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso in 1994, first to the Ministry of Finance and later to the presidency,
marked the start of a period of relative economic stability, which –despite periods of
economic unrest as in late 1998 and early 1999- has lasted until the end of the century.
After a decade of economic mayhem, dominated by external debt, hyperinflation and
failed stabilization plans, the implementation of the Real plan accomplished greater
internal and external stability, relatively low inflation, and moderate but relatively
constant rates of growth during the period 1994-99
1. These economic conditions,
together with the opening of key sectors of the Brazilian economy and greater regional
economic integration in the framework of Mercosur, were at the root of the increasing
interest of foreign investors in Brazil. Since 1994 Brazil has become an important target
for foreign direct investment (FDI), in accordance with its status as not only the largest
economy in Latin America and the eighth in the world, but also as a market with an
enormous economic potential.
Car manufacturers were among the first to spot the opportunities offered by a
more stable economy and invested heavily in Brazil. From the beginning of what is
known as the ‘Novo Regime Automotivo’ (New Automotive Regime)
2 in December
1995 until September 1998, car manufacturers invested 10.683 billion US$ in the
restructuring of existing plants and/or the building of new ones. The Brazilian
government expected the final amount to be of 12.298 billion US$ by the end of 1999,
when the ‘New Automotive Regime’ came to an end. 16 car manufacturers, 150 spare
part companies and 29 companies from other sectors of production have taken advantage
of the conditions provided by the ‘New Automotive Regime’ since early 1996 (MICT,
1998).
                                                       
1 Growth rates in Brazil suffered, however, a blow in the second half of 1998 as a result
of the country’s financial crisis. The growth rate for 1998 was negative (-1.9%),
although stability has returned in the second half of 1999.
2 The ‘New Automotive Regime’ was born within the framework of the Real Plan as a
means to consolidate and foster FDI in the automobile sector. Its main objectives were:
(1) to keep the large manufacturing plants and the large spare parts companies already
installed in the country; (2) to try to restructure existing Brazilian companies; (3) to
attract new companies and to stimulate the construction of new car plants; (4) to try to
consolidate Mercosur and to reinforce Brazil’s position as its key economic actor.3
At first sight, the influx of foreign funds can be considered beneficial for the whole
of the Brazilian economy, since it is expected to generate know-how and technology
transfers and is creating direct employment. In this article, we will, however, argue that
the expansion of FDI in the automobile sector in Brazil is producing perverse effects in
the form of territorial competition among Brazilian states, which may ultimately
jeopardize any long-term economic benefit resulting from the increase in FDI.
Our main aim is to study recent trends in FDI in the automobile sector and to
identify the negative effects generated by the increase in territorial competition linked to
the expansion of investment, that is by the race among Brazilian governors to attract new
car plants to their respective states. The results of the analysis show how these pro-active
‘development’ strategies, both by the Federal and by state governments, degenerate into
a predatory dispute involving states and municipalities with negative results for the public
sector. In order to achieve this, we will first briefly review the theoretical implications of
the process of globalization and institutional reaction in the form of territorial
competition in developing countries, before analysing Brazil's economic evolution. These
sections are followed by the study of FDI in the automobile sector in Brazil. The analysis
of the emergence of territorial competition among Brazilian states in order to attract car
plants to their respective territories comes next. In the final section, we identify the
winners and losers of the process of territorial competition and try to detect the global
impact this process may have on the future of economic activity in Brazil.
Globalization, federalism and territorial competition in developing countries
Although the effects of the process of economic globalization and the opening of markets
for developing countries are by no means uncontroversial, the dominant view in the field
of neoclassical and endogenous growth theories is that a greater integration of
developing economies into the world economy entails more advantages than
disadvantages. From these perspectives, it is considered that any increase in flows of
trade and information between the developed and the developing worlds is likely to give
rise to competitive and restructuring effects which in the medium-term may have a
significant impact on the overall productivity of labour in developing countries
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Hence, open economies -since trade is one of the few
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factors that, according to Levine and Renelt (1992), is consistently robust in determining
the growth outcome of any country - are generally regarded to have a greater capacity to
grow than closed economies. Moreover, open economies are considered to be more
likely to benefit from technological spillovers. Developing countries which increase their
trade with technologically advanced countries are regarded as more capable of boosting
their productivity by acquiring a level of know-how which would otherwise have been
very costly to obtain using their own resources
3 (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman
and Hoffmaister, 1997).
This dominant view has been verified empirically by Sachs and Warner (1995) and
Sachs, Warner, and Hoffmeister (1997). These authors establish a relationship between
the rate of growth of countries and their degree of openness. Their analysis of national
growth rates across the world since the 1960s highlights a stronger degree of
convergence of those developing economies which had remained relatively open during
the period of analysis. These results contrast with the lack of economic convergence of
closed economies. “Open economies might enjoy faster income convergence than closed
economies, since international mobility of capital and technology can speed the transition
to steady-state income” (Sachs and Warner, 1995: 187). Coe, Helpman and Hoffmeister
(1997) report similar results in 77 developing countries regarding the impact of trade on
technological spillovers and growth.
In addition, some authors have emphasized that greater economic integration of
developing countries has not only positive effects in terms of economic efficiency, but
also in terms of inter-territorial equality. The shift from import-substitution to export-
oriented economies in many developing countries during the last decades has led to
“raising demand for unskilled but literate labour, relative to more skilled workers”
(Wood, 1994: 8). Since most of this skilled but literate labour is increasingly found in the
periphery of developing countries, relatively lagging regions in these countries are likely
to benefit more from the opening of the economies than core areas, thus reducing
regional disparities within developing countries (Wood, 1994; Williamson,  1997;
Duranton, 1999).
                                                       
3 The importance of international trade in driving R&D spillovers has, however, been
recently challenged by Keller (1998), who reports similar results to those obtained by
Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) with ramdonly
created trade patterns instead of ‘true’ ones.5
Hence, from this perspective, the shift from closed import-substitution economies
to open economies yields positive results for developing countries, both in terms of
economic efficiency and territorial equality. As a result, combining a reform of trade with
an improvement of the quality of human resources are increasingly considered as the
most adequate policies for economic progress in the developing world.
However, the emergence of subnational institutional actors and, in the case of
Brazil, the revival of federalism, mediate the effects of globalization and foreign direct
investment. Greater economic integration often goes hand in hand with centrifugal forces
and greater demand for regional autonomy (Keating, 1998; Rodríguez-Pose, 1998), as
well as with a relative demise of traditional top-down regional policies and a passing on
of the responsibility for development to subnational governments (Markusen, 1996). The
consequence of these processes is that many regions and localities which had grown
accustomed to the relative protection of the state find that economic integration radically
changes this situation and brings new development challenges and opportunities.
The relatively free movement of goods and capital in countries which have recently
adopted the decision to open their borders generally results in an increase in foreign
direct investment (FDI). However, and in contrast with previous waves of investment,
current FDI is more footloose and less constrained by traditional locational factors.
Infrastructure and human capital improvements allow FDI much greater mobility within
developing countries than hitherto. And the prosperity of each region and locality is
increasingly perceived to be dependent on the capacity of each place to pursue effective
competitive strategies to attract increasingly ‘footloose’ FDI (Cox and Mair, 1988;
Cheshire and Gordon, 1996; Budd, 1998).
Brazil is no exception. Brazilian federalism has in the past followed political cycles:
authoritarian spells favoured a greater centralization of power, whereas decentralization
has always been closely associated to devolution of power to the states (Souza, 1997).
The advent of democracy in the late 1980s has thus been accompanied by an increase of
the political power of state governors and local mayors. And since in Brazil the influence
of governors and mayors is related to the size of the budget of their respective states and
municipalities, the new inflow of FDI has opened up the possibilities to increase local
revenues. The result is that states and municipalities are increasingly involved in
designing and implementing territorially competitive strategies (Rodríguez-Pose,
Tomaney and Klink, 2001). According to Cheshire and Gordon, territorial competition is6
a  “process, through which groups, acting on behalf of the regional or sub-regional
economy, seek to promote it as a location for economic activity either implicitly or
explicitly in competition with other areas” (1996: 385). The type of policies associated
with territorial competition typically range from simple regional marketing to “locational
incentives of various kinds, provision of sites or infrastructure or supply side capacity
building  “ (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996: 387). Since territorial competition is more
concerned with issues of local economic efficiency than with inter-regional equality, the
effects of territorial competition may offset any positive effects related to the process of
economic integration. As Cheshire and Gordon (1998) underline, the impact of territorial
competition may be growth enhancing, when these policies lead to an increase in the
local and national economic welfare, but it may also be either zero-sum (when any
increase in local welfare is achieved at the expense of the welfare of other areas) or even
pure waste (when territorial competition simply represents a waste of resources). In this
latter case, the effects of territorial competition in terms of long-term welfare
improvement tend to be negligible at the local level and may lead to the unleashing of
perverse economic effects elsewhere (Figure 1).
Figure 1 The local and global outcomes of territorial competition
Welfare Improvement
Zero
Sum
Pure
Waste
Growth
Enhancing
+ GLOBAL LEVEL −
+
−
L
O
C
A
L
 
L
E
V
E
L
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t7
In this article, we will argue that the opening of the Brazilian economy has triggered a
process of territorial competition in the automobile sector among Brazilian states. The
final outcome of these bidding wars is pure waste, since locally any possible increase in
welfare is neutralized by the direct and indirect costs of attracting FDI; and globally
territorial competition is leading to the closure of other plants -and hence to lower
economic activity and greater unemployment- elsewhere in the country.
Economic stabilization in Brazil
In the 1980s the Brazilian economy reached a significant impasse. The processes of
industralization, which had been actively encouraged by the government since the 1930s,
and of import-substitution, in place since the 1950s, and which led to the formation of
the largest industrial base in the whole of Latin America, seemed to be exhausted. Large,
mainly obsolete, and very often state controlled industrial complexes and companies
were no longer capable of providing the type of dynamism needed in an increasingly
globalized world. Overspending by the government resulted in a large external debt that
Brazil could no longer service. In addition, high inflation became the norm during much
of the 1980s and early 1990s. Inflation rates reached in some periods -as in early 1990-
levels of 80%  per month (Blumenschein, 1995). This overall situation had a serious
impact on the Brazilian economy: growth rates became extremely volatile, alternating
short periods of high growth with deep economic downturns. Social and regional
inequality increased (Baer, 1983; Storper, 1991). Wage earners were hit by high inflation
(Blumenschein, 1995), private and public investment fell, and "the apparent tendency
toward 'relative' polarization reversal observed in the 1970s came to a halt in the early
1980s" (Storper, 1991: 63). The gap between the industrial core (the states of São
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais) and the rest of the country, which was
shrinking since the beginning of the 1970s, started to increase again, mainly as a result of
the demise of traditional development policies (Cano, 1993).
Successive national governments tried to combat this adverse economic situation
with a series of macroeconomic plans. Such plans (Cruzado, Cruzado II, Bresser, Arroz-
com-Feijão, Verão, Collor I, Collor II, Cardoso I, and Cardoso II) were designed and
implemented between 1986 and 1995. In addition, seven different currencies (cruzado,
cruzado novo, cruzeiro, cruzeiro real, URV, and real), five price and sixteen wage8
policies were used and/or implemented. The main aim of the plans, and of the changes in
currencies and wage policies associated to them, was to try to control prices and wages
and to stabilize the Brazilian currency. Despite being in most cases able to curb inflation
for a short period of time, all these plans failed to deliver a stable economic environment.
The final result of the plans was always similar: return to high government expenditure
and high inflation.
This economic panorama changed in the mid-1990s. With the arrival of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso to the Ministry of Finance in 1994, a new macroeconomic plan -the
Real Plan- was launched. It included many features from previous plans (some kind of
wage and price controls, restrictive monetary policies, and the creation of a new currency
-the Real- pegged to the US dollar), but it also introduced new measures. Apart from
opening some state monopolies to market competition, from including privatisation
packages of state-owned companies, and from greater regional economic integration
with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in the framework of Mercosur, the Real Plan
continued with the opening up of the Brazilian economy started earlier in the decade. It
was, however, a partial opening of the economy, reflecting the mix between the old
conception of the ‘Estado desenvolvimentista’, which still favoured intervention, and the
new conception of a more open economy and a less interventionist state. Whereas tariff
barriers were reduced in certain sectors, other sectors remained highly protected. The
latter was the case of car manufacturing, where external tariffs remained high
4. In
contrast, the car component parts sector was liberalised and was among the first to
experience the impact of foreign competition (Bedê, 1997). This partial opening linked to
the Real Plan is a reflection of the different economic points of view within Cardoso’s
government. As a result, the Real Plan has in certain sectors -like car manufacturing-
promoted a certain return to import-substitution policies. However, and in contrast with
previous policies, the import-substitution process has been driven only by foreign
investment, rather than by Brazilian capital: foreign car manufacturers -their export
capacity limited by the maintenance of high entry barriers- chose to enter the Brazilian
market en masse through FDI and the building of new car plants, rather than by imports.
                                                       
4 Despite the fact that entry tariffs for imported cars have been decreasing in recent years,
they are still relatively high. In 1996 the tariff for companies with plants in Brazil was
35% and for those without plants in the country 70%. These tariffs were expected to go
down to levels of 20 and 35% respectively by 1999 (Posthuma, 1997: 405).9
The reliance on foreign investment is a consequence of the lack of national R&D
strategies in recent Brazilian industrial policy. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s the
Brazilian state encouraged technological transfer from multinational companies to infant
Brazilian industries, in the 1990s there has been less concern with this issue.
In contrast to previous plans, the results of the Real Plan have been relatively long-
lasting. Inflation went down from levels of more than 40% per month in 1994, to a mere
3% annually in 1998. The Brazilian real was for four years a stable currency pegged to
the dollar. Economic growth attained annual rates ranging between 2 and 4% in the
period 1994-1997. Despite these economic achievements, the Brazilian crisis of late 1998
and early 1999 highlighted some of the weaknesses of the system. Economic growth
plummeted in the third quarter of 1998, and the Brazilian Real, which was considered to
be overvalued 15-20% before the January 1999 crisis (The Economist, 1998b), fell to
almost half its value with respect to the US dollar when it was allowed to float freely.
High federal and state deficits limited the capacity of the Brazilian government to redress
its economy and pay its debts, especially after several state governments declared
themselves bankrupt in early 1999. The economic recovery of the second half of 1999
has brought greater stability back, but some of the problems which led to the crisis
remain.
 Foreign investment in the car industry
Although the aforementioned risks cast doubts about Brazil’s future as a market for
manufacturing products, the combination of relative economic stability, liberalization of
capital flows, and still high protection in the car manufacturing sector have acted as a
powerful magnet for FDI. Foreign car manufacturers seem to have suddenly realized that
Brazil is a country which offers huge prospects for business, especially in a sector which
can be considered mature in developed countries. Brazil offers a large market of about
160  million inhabitants with a very low level of car ownership in comparison with
markets in North America, Europe and Japan (Table 1).
Differences between the investment announced by foreign car manufacturers and
real investment make it difficult to calculate the exact volume of FDI in Brazil in the
1990s. The Economist Intelligence Unit has estimated the total investment to be at levels
of 6 billion US$ between 1990 and 1995 and more than 12 billion US$ between 199610
and 2000 (The Economist, 1997b). Bedê (1997: 376-8) reckons the total investment
announced for the period 1995-1999 to be around 11 billion US$. And, as mentioned in
the introduction, data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism puts
investment between December 1995 and September 1998 at levels of 10.6 billion US$
and estimates the total to be of more than 14 billion by the end of 1999 (MICT, 1998).
Table 1
Car ownership (inhabitants per car)
1980 1996
USA   1.4   1.3
Italy   3.0   1.7
Japan   3.1   1.8
Germany 2.5 1.9
France   2.5   1.9
Spain   4.2   2.2
Argentina 6.6 5.8
Brazil 11.8 9.4
Source: Anfavea, December 1998.
This surge in FDI has led the share of the car industry in Brazil's industrial GDP to rise
from levels of 7.8% in 1990 to levels of 12.1% in 1997 (Anfavea, 1998) (Table 2).
Table 2
Share of the car manufacturing
sector in industrial GDP (in %)
1990 7.8
1991 7.8
1992 10.0
1993 10.6
1994 12.0
1995 11.2
1996 11.5
1997 12.1
Source: Anfavea, 1998.
Almost all the main world car manufacturers have announced the building of new, or the
restructuring of existing car plants in Brazil. Fiat, Ford, General Motors, and
Volkswagen are increasing their already sizeable presence, whereas Mercedes and
Renault plan huge new investments. Chrysler, Iveco, Scania, and Volvo are also
targeting Brazil. And Asian companies are joining in: Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Asia
Motors, and Hyundai have announced considerable investments
5  (Table 3).
                                                       
5 Although it the case of Korean manufacturers, the announced investments may be at
risk due to the impact of the Asian crisis on the chaebol.11
Table 3
           Planned FDI in new automobile assembly and motor plants, 1996-
2001
Location Company Country of
origin
Investment
date
Minimum
planned
investment (in
million US$)
Planned
annual
capacity
São Paulo metropolitan area
São Bernardo do Campo BMW/L.Rover Ger./UK 1998 150 15000
Rest of São Paulo state
São Carlos Volkswagen Germany in operation 250 300000*
Mogi das Cruzes GM USA on hold 150 1600000*
Indaiatuba Toyota Japan 1999 150 15000
Sumaré Honda Japan in operation 100 30000
Itu Kia(1) Korea on hold 50 10000
Paraná
São José Pinhais Renault France 1999 750 100000
São José Pinhais VW/Audi Germany 1999 600 120000
Campo Largo Chrysler/BMW USA/Ger. 2000 600 400000*
Campo Largo Chrysler USA 1998 315 12000
Minas Gerais
Juiz de Fora Mercedes Germany 1999 820 70000
Betim Fiat Italy 1998 500 500000*
Sete Lagoas Iveco Italy 1998 250 20000
Belo Horizonte Fiat Italy 1999 200 100000
Rio Grande do Sul
Gravataí GM USA 1999 600 120000
Guaíba Ford(2) USA 2001 500 100000
Caxias do Sul Navistar USA 1998 50 5000
Rio de Janeiro
Porto Real PSA-Peugeot France 2000 600 100000
Resende Volkswagen Germany in operation 250 50000
Bahia
Camaçari Asia(1) Korea on hold 500 60000
Aratu Hyundai(1) Korea on hold 280 20000
Goiás
Catalão Mitsubishi Japan to be defined 35 80000
As of December 1998. Taking into account the volatility of planned investments and the nature
of the data, the data on FDI is to be considered as an approximation and is likely to change.
(1)   Korean investments are curently on hold as a result of the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
(2)   Following a conflict with the newly elected government of Rio Grande do Sul during 1999, Ford
decided to relocate its predicted investment to Camaçari (Bahia) where the state and federal incentive
package are even more attractive for the company than that of Rio Grande do Sul. The new planned
investment is of 1,3 billion US$.
*Motor plants
Sources: MICT, Anfavea, Panorama Setorial.12
Such a large expansion of the industry is only comparable in Brazilian economic history
to what Shapiro (1997) calls the first migration of the car plants during the period
between 1956 and 1970. In those years General Motors, Ford, Mercedes Benz, Toyota,
Volkswagen, Fiat, and Scania established themselves in the country leading to the
formation of the largest car industry agglomeration in Latin America and contributing to
the development of a large and skilled workforce and of a dense network of part
suppliers for the automobile industry.
There is, however, a significant difference in the territorial distribution of car plants
between the first wave of the late 1950s and early 1960s and that of the 1990s. Whereas
during the first expansion of the Brazilian automobile sector foreign investment was,
with the exception of the Fiat plant in Betim (Minas Gerais), fundamentally concentrated
in the São Paulo metropolitan region (and especially in the area known as the Greater
ABC region, south of São Paulo), the recent expansion of the industry is not
geographically concentrated. Although some of the investment has been geared towards
the restructuring of existing car plants
6, and some minor new investment (BMW-Land
Rover’s new plant in São Bernardo do Campo) is announced to go to the Greater São
Paulo area, the bulk of new foreign direct investment is being developed in areas outside
the heart of the Brazilian motor industry. Honda and Toyota have chosen to create new
plants in greenfield sites in the interior of São Paulo state. Kia Motors has a similar
strategy. Most car makers have, however, chosen locations outside the state of São
Paulo, mainly in surrounding states. The main beneficiaries of the surge in FDI have been
the states of Paraná, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro (Figure 2).
Renault, VW-Audi, and Chrysler have decided to build new plants in the state of Paraná;
Rio Grande do Sul signed agreements for the construction of plants with General Motors
and Ford; Minas Gerais with Daimler-Benz , Iveco, and Fiat, and Rio de Janeiro has been
successful in attracting PSA-Peugeot to its territory. Only the Korean manufacturers
Asia and Hyundai (Bahia) and the Japanese Mitsubishi (Goiás) have planned investments
outside the relatively rich South, in some of the less developed Brazilian states of the
                                                       
6 The Ford plant in São Bernardo do Campo, in the Greater ABC region, has been the
main beneficiary of Ford's investment in Brazil. 1.4 billion US$ have been invested in the
modernization of the plant for the production of the Ford Fiesta and Ford Ka models
(Fonseca Silva, 1997). A similar strategy, although with a lower level of robotization of
the production line, has been followed by Fiat at its Betim (Minas Gerais) plant. 600
million US$ have been invested there for the production of the Palio and Tipo models.13
North East and Centre. Other, mainly Asian, companies intend to develop investments
outside the South, but the future of most announced investments is still uncertain.
Overall the North, North East, and the Centre West regions -with the exception of the
state of Bahia, which has recently emerged as a strong player and is likely to attract 8.8%
of the total investment in the sector (MICT, 1997)- still lag behind in terms of FDI
(Figure 2).
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What are the reasons behind the current decentralization of the Brazilian car industry?
Why are foreign car companies shunning the advantages offered by external economies,
by the availability of skilled labour, and by an already existing network of suppliers in
São Paulo and choosing to build their plants in greenfield locations outside the industrial
core of the country? The push factors behind the territorial spread of foreign investment
in the automobile sector during the 1990s are manifold.
First comes the question of labour costs in combination with what Wood (1994)
considers to be the main force in North-South trade: skills. According to the Heckscher-14
Ohlin theory of trade, the increase in trade leads developing countries with a large supply
of literate but relatively unskilled labour to specialize in the production of manufactured
and relatively undifferentiated goods (Wood, 1994). The automobile sector falls within
this category and lower wages in countries like Brazil -together with the incentives of
expanding markets- act as bait for car manufacturers. Wage differentials within Brazil
and the reduction of the educational gap across the country in recent years have led car
companies to look for locations with lower labour costs. In this sense, workers in the
São Paulo metropolitan area are strongly disadvantaged with respect to those of the rest
of the country: the hourly cost per worker in automobile plants in the Greater ABC
region is, in most cases, almost double than that of other car factories in Brazil
7.
Another handicap that São Paulo's motor industry has had to face is the perception
of its workforce as conflict-prone with respect to labour in the rest of Brazil (Rodríguez-
Pose and Tomaney, 1999). Car plants in the ABC region were the cradles of Brazil's
trade union movement. Levels of trade union membership are much higher than
elsewhere in Brazil and the main local trade unions are well-organized. The powerful
Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos (Metalworker's Union) represents the interests of the
workers in the car and the component parts sector. Local unions also have a reputation
of being strike prone, mainly as a consequence of the strikes of the late 1970s and 1980s,
which combined traditional workers' demands with protest movements against the
military regime in power at the time. And this image is proving very hard to shake
8,
                                                       
7 According to data provided by Ford Brazil and by the statistical service of the Sindicato
dos Metalúrgicos (Metalworkers' Union) the hourly cost per worker in the Ford plant at
San Bernardo do Campo (Greater ABC region) was close to 14 US$ (DIEESE, 1997;
Fonseca Silva, 1997). Hourly wages, however, were lower than the hourly cost per
worker, with huge gaps between those workers being paid by the hour (7.02 US$ per
hour on average) and the stable employees (17 US$ per hour) (DIEESE,  1997). In
contrast, the hourly cost per worker in car plants outside the São Paulo metropolitan
area is lower. The Volkswagen plant in the interior of São Paulo State had hourly costs
per worker of 6.80 US$, whereas in the Fiat plant at Betim (Minas Gerais) the average
cost was of 7.30 US$ (Fonseca Silva, 1997). These data coincides with the costs
reported in The Economist (1997a), where it was stated that the average wages at Fiat's
plant were only around 60% of those at Ford's, despite claims from Fiat that, with the
inclusion of other social benefits, the gap was significantly lower.
8 At a successive interviews held in early 1998 with the president (Luiz Marinho) and the
secretary general (Carlos Alberto Grana) of the Sindicato dos Metalurgicos, they both
complained about the difficulties they found changing the conflictive image of the trade
union, despite its past record of collaboration with the management of companies, their15
especially among car manufacturers. This reputation is in stark contrast with that of the
rest of the country as a less-unionized and almost conflict-free location. As Fiat
managers at the Betim plant (Minas Gerais) boast, not as single hour had been lost to
strikes in the last 14 years (The Economist, 1997a).
An additional push factor working against São Paulo is the demise of some of the
conditions that facilitated the concentration of investment in the 1950s and 1960s. In that
period poor road and rail infrastructure in Brazil and the concentration of the market and
of skilled labour in the South East of the country contributed to the development of car
plants in and around the São Paulo metropolitan region. The amelioration of road
infrastructure in Brazil in the last three decades together with the need of targeting wider
markets, both inside and outside the country, as well as technological advances in car
manufacturing, give companies greater leeway when choosing the location of their
plants.
The level of congestion and pollution -together with a series of administrative
problems- in the metropolitan area of São Paulo also work against the establishment of
new plants there and in favour of alternative locations. High land costs, a rundown road
infrastructure, which has been clearly outgrown by the city and which tends to flood
every time it rains, and the lack of co-ordination among municipalities
9 and between the
city of São Paulo and the surrounding councils are often cited as factors which increase
the cost of directing industrial investment to São Paulo (The Economist, 1998a).
The labour cost differential between São Paulo and the rest of the country, in
combination with all the other push factors, provide the economic rationale for the
direction of FDI in the car industry away from the traditional industrial core towards
other states, returning to the decentralization trend of the 1970s and early 1980s (Cano,
1993). In this sense, the process of globalization and the increasing internationalization
of the Brazilian economy could be succeeding at what traditional regional policies failed:
reducing regional inequalities in Brazil, since FDI is increasingly located outside the
traditional core. This trend would come to support Wood's (1994) and Williamson's
                                                                                                                                                                  
low strike record in recent years, and their active participation in the signing of the car
industry agreements of 1992 and 1993.
9 The Chamber of the Greater ABC -a forum which includes representatives from the
municipalities of the automobile belt of São Paulo- is the only exception.16
(1997) hypothesis of the beneficial effects of international trade and movement of capital
in developing countries.
Territorial competition for foreign investment in the Brazilian car sector
The aforementioned push factors have been constantly brandished by car manufacturers
in order to justify the establishment of new car plants in states such as Minas Gerais, Rio
Grande do Sul, or Paraná. However, these push factors alone do not suffice to explain
the current process of decentralization that the Brazilian car industry is witnessing.
Higher labour costs, trade union membership and congestion are countered by important
pull factors in the São Paulo metropolitan region in terms of accessibility to markets and
economies of agglomeration. Being the largest single market in South America and
having the largest agglomeration of industries and the largest pool of skilled labour still
outweigh the push factors in the decisional location of companies. A recent survey of the
factors behind the locational decisions of new plants in Brazil conducted by the
Confederação Nacional da Indústria (National Industrial Confederation, CNI) confirmed
this view. Proximity to markets and the specific advantages of each location were more
important in determining the locational decisions of firms than labour costs, trade union
membership and spatial congestion (Table 4).
Table 4
Factors behind the location of new plants in Brazil (%)
Proximity to markets 57.3
Tax breaks 57.3
Labour costs 41.5
Specific advantages of each location 39.0
Trade union membership 24.4
Spatial congestion 14.6
Source: CNI/CEPAL, 1997.
The locational behaviour of car manufacturers in the early 1990s seemed to conform to
this pattern. São Paulo was the preferred location. Hyundai announced in 1995 that it
was going to spend about 1 billion US$ in the building of a car plant there. Ford also
invested heavily in the restructuring of its assembly plant in São Bernardo do Campo, in
the São Paulo metropolitan region. Only the burst into scene of the bidding wars and the17
tax breaks and incentives associated to them has tilted the balance in favour of alternative
locations. According to the survey by the Confederação Nacional da Indústria, tax
breaks are as important as proximity to markets in determining the choice of location of
new plants in Brazil (Table 4). If this factor is added to labour costs, trade union
membership and spatial congestion, the factors pushing investment away from São Paulo
become clearly more significant than any pull factor. As a result, since the advent of the
bidding wars Hyundai is now likely to build is new plant in the state of Bahia, and Ford
has shifted its announced investment from São Paulo to Rio Grande do Sul first, and
later to Bahia. Only one of the latest twenty-two announcements of FDI in new
automobile assembly and motor plants –that of BMW-Land Rover in São Bernardo do
Campo- is to take place in the São Paulo metropolitan area.
The bidding wars for FDI among Brazilian states have been triggered by the
progressive insertion of Brazil in the world economy. The massive influx of FDI and the
apparent retreat of the Federal Government from the field of active regional policy have
whetted the appetite of different Brazilian states. From Rio Grande do Sul to Amazonia,
from Rondônia to Bahia, many Brazilian states are vying to attract greater foreign
investment. This process, encouraged at first by the Brazilian government within the
framework of the New Automotive Regime, quickly started to show its negative side.
State politicians eager, on the one hand, to present themselves as generators of
employment and modernizers, and fearing, on the other, losing out to neighbours,
increasingly resorted to incentives, subsidies, and tax breaks as the main means to attract
international car companies to their territories. Tax or bidding wars have become the
norm in the motor industry. Motor companies wanting to set up new plants to service a
growing Brazilian and South American market have taken advantage of the situation and
approach different states simultaneously in order to reach the best possible deal for their
interests.
Although negotiations between car companies and the states may adopt different
forms, most deals are cut by the same cloth. In compensation for the establishment of a
car plant within its territory, the state and the city where the plant is to be built provide a
series of incentives which inevitably include the following points:
a) The donation of the land or, at least, of a large percentage of it.18
b)  The provision of the necessary infrastructure for the preparation of the site.
This usually includes road infrastructure and utilities, but in some cases it goes
as far as rail links and the development of port terminals.
c) The provision of state and local tax breaks for periods which in no case are
shorter than ten years, and which, in some cases, even include tax breaks on
the import of car parts.
d)  The provision of loans by the state at fixed rates well below those of the
Brazilian credit market
10.
e)  A series of financial and legislative cautions and guarantees.
f) A sundry set of additional benefits, which range from providing public
transport for workers and nurseries for workers' children to various
environmental measures.
Depending on the bargaining power of each individual company and each state the final
conditions may vary, but the terms of the ‘protocols’
11 or agreements inevitably favour
the company. A brief review of some of these agreements confirms the difference in
bargaining power between the motor companies and the Brazilian states.
One of the first states to actively engage in the bidding wars was Paraná. In March
1996 its government, together with the municipality of São José dos Pinhais and the
Economic Development Fund, signed an agreement with Renault. The conditions of the
agreement establish that Renault had to build a new car plant in São José dos Pinhais by
the beginning of 1999, and that the plant should represent 60% of the total capital of
Renault in Brazil. Renault agreed to create 1,500 direct jobs and to pay 50.5 million
Reais if the plant were to be dismantled in less than twenty years after the beginning of
operations. The state of Paraná and the municipality of São José dos Pinhais agreed, in
turn, to donate 2.5 million square metres for the plant, to provide all the necessary
infrastructure and utilities at the site, as well as all the main accesses, including a railway
                                                       
10 It must be noted that in most agreements any credit given to the car makers is always
repayable in local currency, whereas any debt incurred by the state with the car
companies tends to be guaranteed in US dollars.
11  The name used in Brazil to describe the agreements reached between the states and
the car companies is ‘Protocolos’ (or ‘protocols‘). These protocols differ from normal
contracts in the sense that the documents are, in general, not made public and are given a
similar status to ‘state secrets’.19
access and an exclusive area in the port of Paranaguá. The supply of electricity at prices
25% below market value was another clause in the protocol. In addition, the agreement
contains a series of financial clauses by which the state takes responsibility for 40% of
the total capital invested, up to a maximum of 300 million Reais (300 million US$ at the
time of the agreement) and to give loans based on the level of production and the total
level of investment. These loans, without interest or clause which may take into account
the devaluation of the currency, are to be repaid after ten years of the beginning of
operations. Finally, Renault enjoys a series of regional and local tax breaks for a period
of ten years, with similar conditions for any Renault suppliers involved in the project
(Protocol between Renault and the State of Paraná, 1996)
12.
The agreement between Renault and Paraná laid down the norm for successive
protocols between states and car manufacturers. Mercedes-Benz was next in line. In
exchange for an investment of a minimum of 400 million US$ and the genesis of 1,500
direct jobs
13 for the development of a new plant in Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais),
Mercedes-Benz secured from the state and the city an extensive list of prerogatives.
These included a series of loans for the development of fixed and mobile investment
which amounted to a total of almost 112 million reais (ca. 100 million US$ at the time of
signing the agreement, 16 December 1996), plus additional loans linked to the final
volume of production; tax breaks from a series of state and local taxes for a period of 10
years; the donation of 2.8 million square metres for the development of the plant; several
infrastructural developments, which included the urbanization of the banks of the
Paraibuna river, the construction of the roads to access the plant, car parks, a test circuit,
as well as a rail link to the plant, the development of utilities and sanitation (with lower
water costs for ten years); and minor additional settlements concerning schools for the
children of employees. In addition, Mercedes-Benz got from the state the establishment
of tougher environmental regulations for the site, in order to prevent other companies
from developing activities in the neighbourhood -including cancelling licences to extract
                                                       
12 The governor of the State of Paraná, Jaime Lerner, a political ally of president
Cardoso, took responsibility for 40% of all investment by Renault, at a time when the
Brazilian state is retreating from industrial investment. The main documents of the
agreement between the state of Paraná and Renault are still not open to the public and
we are not sure if there are additional clauses to the ones we have used in this paper.20
sand from the nearby river and limiting the burning of wood- which are deemed to have a
detrimental effect for production in the Mercedes plant (Protocol between Mercedes-
Benz and the State of Minas Gerais, 1996).
The conditions of the agreement between General Motors Brazil and the state of
Rio Grande do Sul for the establishment of a GM plant near its capital, Porto Alegre, are
also extremely beneficial for the company. The protocol includes lending 335 million
reais (ca. 310 million US$ at the time of signing the agreement: March 1997) to GM at a
rate of 6%, well below the usual Brazilian market rates (which fluctuated around 40%
between 1997 and 1999). This loan is to be destined by GM to the purchase of the land
and the development of the plant, and the state is to reimburse GM all investment in
physical capital made for the plant at US$ rates (albeit payments are to be made in
Brazilian reais). The repayment of the loan is to start in the year 2002. Tax breaks
expand for a period of 15 years. In addition, the locality and the state have to provide the
necessary infrastructure including all utilities, sanitation, and links to the road system.
Water, electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and sewage disposal are to be
subsidised (or, as stated in the protocol, "supplied at an internationally competitive
cost"). However, the most stunning feature of the agreement is the development of
additional infrastructure for the site. It was agreed that the state was to build private port
facilities for GM and to dig out an access canal of a minimum depth of twenty feet, as
well as to provide for the preparation of the site. Finally, the protocol also includes a
series of measures destined to reinforce security at the site and provide public transport
to the factory (Protocol between General Motors Brazil and the state of Rio Grande do
Sul, 1997).
Ford signed a protocol with the state of Rio Grande do Sul a few months later
which in many ways mirrored that of GM. In exchange for the construction of a car plant
with a capacity of around 100,000 cars per calendar year and an minimum estimated
investment of 500 million US$ and a maximum of 1 billion, the state of Rio Grade do Sul
agreed to grant the car maker a 700 million US$ loan at the same low rate of 6% in
order to finance the fixed investment, plus additional low rate loans to finance mobile
investment. The protocol includes similar tax breaks to those granted to GM, plus the
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
13 In addition to a series of minor additional concessions and vague promises, such as to
import all its vehicles through the plant at Juiz de Fora, to try to use local suppliers and
to favour the development of co-operation with local research and development centres.21
usual donation of the land (600 hectares), the construction of all road infrastructure, site
preparation and the provision of utilities "at prices no higher than those charged to third
parties". Ford will also be provided with a private sea and river port terminal (Protocol
between Ford and the state of Rio Grande do Sul, 1997).
Even companies with relatively minor investments enjoy an enormous bargaining
power vis-à-vis the Brazilian state executives. DDMB, a company linked to Chrysler,
planning to invest 30 million reais (circa 25 million US$ at the time of the agreement) in
a diesel motor plant, managed to negotiate extremely advantageous conditions from the
state of Paraná. The terms of the protocol are very similar to those of large car
manufacturers: donation of the land, provision of the necessary infrastructure and
telecommunications, tax breaks in all state taxes, including those on the import of spare
parts, provided they enter Brazil via roads, port, or airports in the state of Paraná
(Protocol between DDMB and the state of Paraná, 1997).
Justification and possible consequences of the bidding wars
Engaging in the bidding wars is justified by state authorities from various viewpoints.
FDI is perceived as the panacea for the dynamization of local economies and for the
generation of employment. The name of the programme which regulates fiscal incentives
in the state of Paraná is revealing: ‘Programme for More Employment (Paraná); Fiscal
Incentives’. The main objective of such a programme is to attract foreign industrial
investment to the state of Paraná, since it is thought that new industrial investment (and
especially investment in the automotive sector) will trigger multiplier effects and
dynamize the economy of the state by attracting part suppliers, stimulating technological
progress and the development of new products, and generating new investment
(Government of Paraná, 1995). The final result would be the creation of new direct and,
above all, indirect jobs, which will ultimately lead to the development of the state.
The state of Rio Grande do Sul also puts employment at the core of the effort in
territorial competition. In a document commissioned by the state government about the
possible impact on employment of the establishment of GM in Rio Grande do Sul, the
Federação da Industria do estado do Rio Grande do Sur (FIERGS, the Rio Grande do22
Sul Industrial Federation) highlighted the creation of direct employment
14, the possible
spillover effects, and the backward and forward linkages generated by the plant as the
reasons justifying the incentives granted to GM (FIERGS, 1996). Rather optimistically,
the document goes on to estimate the possible impact on the creation of employment.
"Our (conservative) estimate about the generation of employment in the state and in all
the car production chain is as follows: 201,000 jobs" (FIERGS, 1996: 4). That is about
150 indirect jobs per direct job created.
The success of the Fiat car plant in Betim (Minas Gerais), the only large plant
established outside the São Paulo metropolitan region before the recent wave of new
investments, also acts as a powerful incentive for state governments to engage in bidding
wars. In the beginning of the 1970s the municipality of Betim and the state of Minas
Gerais managed to attract a Fiat plant with an incentive package that included a
participation by the state in the project which amounted to 50% of the initial investment,
plus the provision of the necessary infrastructure for the state, as well as state and local
tax abatements. Since the opening of the plant in 1976 the city of Betim has been
thoroughly transformed. Its population has jumped from 37,815 inhabitants in 1970 to
310,000 in the late 1990s. The Fiat plant employs 12,000 workers and has attracted
numerous suppliers, not just to the city of Betim, but also to the industrial belt of Belo
Horizonte, the capital of Minas Gerais. In addition, Betim has also benefited from the
location in the area of several oil refineries and oil distribution companies of the
Petrobrás national oil monopoly. As a consequence Betim’s contribution to the ICMS
(the state tax on the circulation of goods and services) has increased from 0.28% in 1970
to 13.6% in 1996 (Fundação João Pinheiro, 1995)
Finally, a third justification for engaging in bidding wars is simply the fear of being
left out. In a document elaborated by the Department of Development and International
Affairs of the state of Rio Grande do Sul this reasoning is stated bluntly. First, and after
acknowledging the massive influx of foreign investment that is taking place in the
Brazilian automotive sector and which "is profoundly altering the spatial distribution of
national development" (Government of Rio Grande do Sul, 1997: 2), it is pointed out
that "the state of Rio Grande do Sul cannot remain aside from this whole process"
                                                       
    
14 The documents underlines that "a car plant, being a labour intensive industry, tends
to generate, a very high number of jobs, directly or indirectly in other sectors of the
productive chain" (FIERGS, 1996: 2).23
(Government of Rio Grande do Sul, 1997: 2). However, as the whole process is taking
place in "an atmosphere of unremitting competition among Brazilian states", there is a
need to offer the "potential investor powerful incentives, capable not only of exceeding
offers from competitors, but also of compensating the structural disadvantage of our
location at the Southernmost end of the country
15" (Government of Rio Grande do Sul,
1997: 2).
Hence, from this point of view, it becomes obvious that no Brazilian state can
afford to avoid this sort of competition, since this would imply losing out the
development battle and almost irretrievably curtailing its development potential.
However, there is little evidence that participating in the bidding wars will bring the
benefits outlined in the documents drafted by most states involved in the process. In fact,
there are indications in the agreements that contradict the argument of the multiplier
effects and spillovers linked to the construction of new car plants. First of all, the impact
is likely to be felt at the level of the generation of direct jobs. New plants will certainly
boost the low productivity in the Brazilian car industry. Whereas productivity in existing
Brazilian plants is now at levels that in most cases barely exceed 20 cars per worker per
annum, new plants are likely to increase overall productivity to 40 vehicles (Rodríguez-
Pose and Tomaney, 1999). This will imply, at best, jobless growth and, at worst, a
reduction in direct employment, since any increase in productivity will be the result of a
combination of more advanced technology and better organizational structures.
The claim that new car plants will generate technological spillovers is also
questionable since most plants are designed to operate as assembly plants and are devoid
of R&D facilities. New technologies will therefore be in most cases developed elsewhere
in the world and applied later in Brazil. Only the possible development of new models
included in some of the agreements offers some ray of hope about the possibility of
technological spillovers. The world launch in Brazil of the Fiat Palio may be an early
indication in this sense. However, most of the protocols only include general references
to the development of R&D facilities by car manufacturers and vague considerations
about the co-operation between the car makers and Brazilian R&D centres.
                                                       
    
15 This factor is called in the document "Custo Rio Grande do Sul" (or Rio Grande do
Sul Cost). This supposed cost is present throughout the document, conveniently ignoring
the fact that Rio Grande do Sul enjoys a very attractive location in the Mercosur area,
being equidistant from its two main markets: São Paulo and Buenos Aires.24
But even more unlikely is the possible impact these plants will have on the genesis
of indirect jobs. In contrast with the clearly over-optimistic analyses used by state
governments to justify the deals with car makers, several of the clauses included in the
agreements may work in the opposite direction, not only not creating a large amount of
indirect jobs, but also destroying some of the existing ones. The building of direct rail
and road links to the plants, as well as of canals and private port terminals (as in the case
of the agreements signed by the state of Rio Grande do Sul), facilitates the export of cars
to other parts of Brazil, South America, and the World. But it also simplifies the whole
process of importing car component parts. All that, in combination with the substantial
tax breaks for the import of parts, is likely to work against the emergence of local
suppliers and to put in increasing difficulty the powerful but struggling Brazilian
component parts industry. However, the rise in unemployment is unlikely to occur in the
states attracting the plants, as a result of their lack of tradition in the car industry. The
impact will be felt in the greater São Paulo metropolitan area, where most of the existing
component parts companies are located. It is true that, for the most part, these
companies are uncompetitive and need restructuring
16 (Ó hUallacháin and Wasserman,
1999), but the increasing direct link between Brazilian car makers and outside suppliers
is likely to curtail any chance of restructuring, especially taking into account that Brazil
lacks the specialised institutions and targeted policies, as well as the governance
structures, which would help local industries through the process of restructuring
(Meyer-Stamer, 1997).
Moreover, the chances that the success of the Fiat plant in Betim may be repeated
are small. First, because the establishment of Fiat took place under an authoritarian
regime which kept territorial competition tightly under control. Second, the Fiat
agreement was a one-off case, whereas incentive packages for foreign car manufacturers
are now the norm. Third, the establishment of suppliers around the Betim plant in the
1970s and 1980s occurred in a context in which the import of component parts was
heavily regulated. Most recent protocols, as we have seen, included tax exemptions or
abatements for the import of component parts.
                                                       
16 According to Ó hUallacháin and Wasserman, “import restrictions were a boon to the
local parts makers. They guaranteed high profits, provided few incentives to cut costs or
improve quality, and encouraged opportunistic price gouging of assemblers during peak
demand periods” (1999: 26).25
If all these factors are taken into consideration, the bidding wars among Brazilian
states become not even a zero-sum form of territorial competition, but more a pure
waste from a national perspective. States vying to attract car companies are in fact
financing a large percentage of the establishment and running of plants which would in
any case have chosen Brazil as their location, mainly because of the growth potential of
the Brazilian and South American car markets. This in itself is nothing new. Efforts to
bring in foreign capital in the automobile sector and the bidding wars related to them are
not limited to Brazil. Countries in Europe, but specially the Southern states in the US
have recurred massively to these strategies in the last few decades. Deals such as those of
Toyota in Kentucky, BMW in South Carolina and Daimler-Benz in Alabama (Donahue,
1997: 97-101) or hints by companies such as BMW to relocate its Longbridge (UK)
Rover plant or by Ford to do the same with its Almusafes (Spain) plant do not make the
situation in the US and Europe radically different from that of Brazil. This issue has even
raised in the US important discussions about the convenience and the possible economic
and political implications of the so-called “race to the bottom” (Schram, 1999). However
and despite the similar nature of the deals, there are several factors which, in our opinion,
tilt the balance in favour of large car manufacturers in Brazil more than in Europe or the
US. First and foremost, the lack of strong regulating bodies such as the European
Commission -and of its Competition Commissioner, in particular, with its power to
scrutinise state aids to business and to impose sanctions if necessary- represents a serious
handicap. The Conselho Nacional de Política Fazendaria (National Fiscal Policy Council,
Confaz), which on paper should fulfil a similar role to the European Competition
Commissioner on those matters, is an ineffectual and demoralised institution. It is made
up of the Secretaries of the Treasury of all Brazilian states and any decision should be
unanimous. The unanimity rule renders the Confaz incapable of intervening in the bidding
wars, since any state involved in a deal with a foreign car manufacturer would have the
right to veto any decision.
Second, the Brazilian states are less prepared that European nations or North
American states to negotiate on a par with large transnational companies. After years of
implementing policies -especially during authoritarian periods- which were subordinated
to federal government directives and which left little room for manoeuvre, states, regions
and municipalities find themselves often unprepared to construct the new policies that the
new economic and political conditions require. For the most part, states and26
municipalities adopt the same instruments they inherited directly from the ‘national-
developmentalist’ state. From this perspective, the bidding wars are often conducted
using the old authoritarian political style at the state level (Arbix and Zilbovicius, 1997).
Finally, factors such as the relative weakness of Brazil’s civil society (especially in
comparison to Western Europe or North America), the volatility of the Brazilian political
panorama, a scarcely developed system of checks and balances, the lack of interest of
large sections of the population in Brazilian political life, together with the fact that the
stability of Cardoso’s government has depended on the support of regional barons, have
contributed to the development of these bidding wars and to render their results
relatively opaque.
Conclusions
The development of territorial competition among Brazilian states vying to attract FDI in
the automobile sector to their territories since 1995 is risking any possible long-term
benefits associated with the attraction of greater FDI in this sector. The bidding wars,
presented by state governments as their main –and almost only- development strategy,
are a pure waste since they do not lead to a significant increase in welfare neither at the
local, nor at the Brazilian level.
At the local level, Brazilian states governments are jeopardizing state budgets in
order to fulfil what are no more than short-term political interests. With the excuse that
they generate, on the most favourable assumptions, several thousands direct and indirect
jobs and bring advanced technology, state governments are granting multinational car
companies a series of subsidies and incentives that the car companies simply cannot
refuse. Indeed, in view of the advantages they may obtain from the bidding wars, car
companies encourage such competition and play Brazilian states against one another in
order to achieve the best possible deal. The net result is that in many cases the conditions
granted by the states to car manufacturers setting up plants in their territory are putting
an enormous strain on the limited budgets of the different Brazilian states, which are in
general largely devoted to the payment of wages. The consequence is that the limited
resources that could be used for the implementation of public policies are being re-routed
to subsidies and incentives in order to attract car plants. In addition, states are going into
debt. Many of the loans granted to the car manufacturers will only start to be repaid well27
into the twenty-first century and almost certainly in a currency that will be worth much
less than what it was at the time of the loan. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that in
January 1999 seven state governments declared themselves bankrupt, contributing to
trigger with their action an economic crisis that led to almost the halving of the value of
the Brazilian Real against the Dollar. Among the governments declaring themselves
insolvent were several of the most active in the bidding wars: Minas Gerais (whose
newly elected governor, former president Itamar Franco, started the whole process), Rio
Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro.
Yet, all the effort put by local governments in the bidding wars is likely to yield
little or no economic benefit. Apart from the direct jobs created at a huge cost for the
local economy, there is little evidence or guarantee that, once established, the plants will
bring further direct investment in terms of suppliers, that they will rely on local
component parts companies, or that they will develop R&D facilities in the area leading
to the genesis of technological spillovers. Incentives such as the construction of direct
infrastructural links to the plant and tax breaks on the import of spare parts are likely to
operate in the opposite direction, with R&D and most component parts increasingly
generated and/or produced elsewhere and the majority of the plants remaining just as
assembly plants.
At the Brazilian level, the outbreak of the bidding wars is also unlikely to increase
welfare. States are bidding for FDI that, in most cases, was already announced to go to
Brazil at the time of the signing of the New Automotive Regime. And the conditions the
states are granting car companies are already having a negative impact on the whole of
the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and especially in the car component parts sector.
What was the largest (albeit rather inefficient) component parts sector in the whole of
Latin America is being quickly dismantled despite the huge increase in car production
(Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney, 1999). Those few companies that were considered
profitable have been bought by foreign companies and most of the rest are closing. The
São Paulo metropolitan region is bearing the brunt of the crisis. Manufacturing
employment has almost halved over the last ten years (DIEESE, 1997).
Another negative outcome of the bidding wars has been increasing conflict among
state governments, and especially between those who adopt different options in the
courtship of capital (Donahue, 1997: 105-119): on the one hand, the states which have
decided to play and are aggressively involved in the bidding wars (mainly Paraná, Minas28
Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and, more recently Bahia), and, on the other, those which
refuse to play. The main economic actor in Brazil -the state of São Paulo- is championing
this latter position, but just hints of the possibility of a change in this attitude by the
governor of the state, Mario Covas, were enough to provoke a lively debate about the
implications of the bidding wars. Any involvement of São Paulo state in the process –
such as the retaliation measures recently approved by its government, taxing
manufactured products which have benefited from incentives- will inevitably cause
greater conflict.
What has been the role of the Brazilian state in all this process? At the beginning
incentives and subsidies as a means of attracting companies were encouraged in the New
Automotive Regime. Later the federal government tolerated or even approved this sort
of practice, which was made possible by the hybrid and partial opening of the economy.
When finally the bidding wars got out of hand, the Brazilian state failed to set up the
adequate institutions that would have prevented the development perverse forms of
territorial competition. The fact that any type of restriction in the power of states to give
incentives has to be presented and approved by the Parliament also did not help the
government to limit the effects of the bidding wars. The fragmentation of the Brazilian
political spectrum and the precarious and volatile majority of Cardoso’s government
made it almost impossible for the Brazilian government to intervene in the short-run.
In sum, it could be said that the bidding wars in the automobile sector represent a
Faustian pact for the Brazilian state. The partial and haphazard opening of the economy,
the weakness of the Brazilian state to control global processes and the populism of most
Brazilian governors have contributed to unleash the most perverse effects of
globalization; effects that, despite triggering short-term and geographically localized
spells of economic growth, are likely to lead, in the medium and long-run, towards
greater dependency, greater instability, greater disparities, and probably greater poverty.
Yet not all indications are negative. There are encouraging signs in Brazil that the
civil society is starting to realize the pernicious impact of the bidding wars and to
mobilize against them. A clear sign of change occurred in the state elections of late 1998.
Several of the governors who had more aggressively bid to attract car plants lost to their
rivals. That was, for example, the case of the governors of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande
do Sul. In the case of the latter, the agreements signed by the regional government with
General Motors and Ford became one of the key issues in the electoral campaign, and29
the new Governor -Olivio Dutra of the Workers Party- asked for a re-egotiation of the
agreements signed by the former government with GM and Ford. This is a first step in
what may be a change in the attitude of the Brazilian society towards the incentives and
subsidies given to companies. However, in order to avoid further negative impacts,
Brazil needs to build a new relationship between the public and the private sector and to
design policies which will prevent the Brazilian state from becoming hostage to the
specific interests of both multinational companies and local politicians.30
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